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21 Introduction
‘Environmental refugee’ is a term that is gaining in popularity. This new 
sustainable development fashionable term seems quite self-explanatory. From the outset, 
it gives some idea of its meaning: refugees that flee due to environmental causes. But 
from an international law point of view, the combination of the words ‘environmental’ 
and ‘refugee’, with their respective implications, add up to a complex concept which 
cannot be so simply defined. 
The most cited definition of ‘environmental refugee’ is found in Essam El-
Hinnawi’s report Environmental Refugees published by the UNEP in 1985, where the 
author defines this category of migrant as follows:
Those people who have been forced to leave their traditional 
habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked 
environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that 
jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality 
of their life [sic]. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this definition 
is meant any physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the 
ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily or 
permanently, unsuitable to support human life.1
Ten years after the publication of El-Hinnawi’s report, Norman Myers, a well-
known author in the field of environmentally triggered migration, defined environmental 
refugees as:
people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood on their 
homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, 
deforestation and other environmental problems. In their 
desperation, they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary 
elsewhere (…). Not all of them have fled their countries; many 
are ‘internally displaced’. But all have abandoned their homeland 
on a semi-permanent if not permanent basis, having little hope of 
foreseeable return.2
1 El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees, UNEP, 1985, at p.4.
2 Myers, Norman; Kent, Jennifer, Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena, Climate 
Institute, Washington, DC, U.S.A., 1995 at p. 14.
3Reading those definitions, one naturally thinks about cyclones and hurricanes, 
tsunami and earthquakes, hailstorms or heavy rains, which are usually the first causes that 
come to mind since they are the most impressive. However, more complex environmental 
problems leading to migration, which are not directly attributable to sudden natural 
disasters, illustrate the full content of those definitions and help better understand what is 
referred to by ‘environmental refugee’. 
To give but one example, in Mozambique, the Tropical cyclone Favio, in 
February 2007, has worsened the situation of flooding created by persistent and heavy 
rainfalls causing the overflowing of rivers in the region in addition to Mozambique’s 
geographical position of water receptacle for the neighbouring countries. Therefore, the 
reception of water not absorbed by the neighbouring lands due to causes such as dryness 
of land and deforestation led to heavy rainfalls, and increase in the monsoon poses a 
serious threat. On 23rd of February, the Central Emergency Response Fund3 (CERF) had 
already authorized funding of 7,6 M $ to aid 142 000 displaced persons4. The United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) now estimates that 
85,000 people could be directly affected5.
The environmental causes of migration are usually divided between ‘slow onset 
environmentally induced movement’ and ‘acute onset environmentally induced 
movement’, both leading to temporary or permanent displacement. These categories can 
be paraphrased as long-term degradation of the environment versus sudden 
environmental disruption including the subcategory of accidents, also sometime added as 
yet another category6. 
3 Formerly the Central Emergency Revolving Fund modified by General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/60/124.
4 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?)penForm&rc=1&cc=moz
5 idem.
6 McCue, Gregory. Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to Involuntary 
Migration. 6 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 151 1993-1994.
4Because the international legal refugee regime does not recognize 
environmentally displaced persons, opinions are divided as to which legal status should 
be accorded to those migrants as well as to the possible and best solutions to address this 
growing problem. In the next pages, a brief presentation of the legal issues triggered by 
the de facto environmentally displaced persons will precede a review of the main 
positions fuelling the debate regarding the legal status of these displaced people. While 
the adoption of a new instrument rallies the majority as being the solution that best 
answers these legal loopholes, there is no general agreement as to the form and content 
nor as to the approach to this new convention. Whether to it is the perspective from 
which to tackle the problem, that is through refugee or environmental point of view, or 
the rights and obligations incumbent upon the States and migrants, the idea of a new 
international instrument raises many issues. This paper will focus on the former of these 
points and will discuss more specifically two approaches to decision-making as to the 
qualification of a migrant for help granted by this hypothetical convention, by sketching 
some of the legal issues arising from both an individual and from a group assessment 
basis.  
52 Facing Consequences of Environmental Degradation: Addressing Global 
Situations on an Individual Basis?
At the end of 2006, the number of people 'of concern' to United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had risen to 32.9 million, and of those, 9.9 million 
were refugees7. Norman Myers calculated in 1995 the number of ‘environmental 
refugees’ to be at 25 million, comprising Internally Displaced Persons8. Most studies 
show that this figure is on the rise and will continue to rise due mainly to population 
growth and environmental degradation. Scientific knowledge and available data from 
affected countries reveal that the pressure is strengthening9 on the main causes of 
environmental disruption10. The further degradation of the environment, coupled with de 
facto migration attributable to environmental factors and a lack of de jure recognition of 
‘environmental migrants’, raise several interesting but difficult issues that will need to be 
tackled by the international community in the near future. 
The existence of a duty to mitigate environmental causes leading to or triggering 
migration and the ensuing liability of States is one related issue. Principles, treaties and 
guidelines for emergency response and preparedness have been established by the United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions11 (leading to the creation of the International 
7 UNHCR 2006 Global Refugee Trends, http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4676a71d4.pdf, as 
revised the 16 July 2007.
8International Displaced Persons (IDPs) are described in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places 
of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations 
of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognized State border”; OCHA/IDP/2004/01, United Nations Publication 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis –
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, February 2007.
10 N. Myers identifies 14 pressure points: landleness; deforestation; desertification; soil erosion; salinization 
and water loggin of irritated land; water deficit and droughts; agricultural stress; biodiversity depletion; 
extreme weather event and climate change; population pressure; diseases and malnutrition; poverty; 
governmental shortcomings; and subsidiary causes of involuntary migration; supra footnote 2.
11 Such as A/RES/61/200 of 16 February 2007 on Natural disasters and vulnerability; A/RES/61/198 of 16 
February 2007 on International Strategy for Disaster Reduction; A/RES/60/195 of 2 March 2006 on 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction; A/RES/60/196 of 2 March 2006 on Natural disasters and 
vulnerability; A/RES/59/231 of 22 February 2005 on International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and 
more available at http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-ga-resolution-eng.htm
6Strategy for Disaster Reduction), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies12 as well as the OCHA; however, when it comes to slow onset 
environmental disruption such as global warming, the obligation on the international 
community to mitigate the negative effects of their policies in order to avoid future 
possible threats to the environment and, by the same token, displacement of population is 
yet to be defined. For example, if a country carries out a policy of uncontrolled 
deforestation, which amplifies flooding caused by heavier monsoon 
attributable to global warming because of the lack of forest to retain the 
water, and if flooding and landslide then extends to both the State in 
question and neighbouring countries, one can wonder what liability and what 
responsibilities towards the affected neighbours fall upon that State. In international 
environmental law, States have exclusive jurisdiction over their own territory and the 
way they exploit their resources13. But that sovereign right is subject to a duty to ensure 
that the activities carried out do not cause damages to the environment outside their 
national jurisdiction14. In the above example, is the increase in the monsoon due to 
climate change too remote to engage the liability of the State proceeding to deforestation? 
If such liability is established, what kind of reparation can be demanded? Could remedies 
include assistance to persons displaced because of famine and health problems as a result 
of the liable State’s policies? 
These questions relating to States’ liability lead to the issue of the very existence 
and, in the affirmative, the scope, of obligation of the neighbouring countries to accept 
‘environmental migrants’ on their respective territory and to offer them protection. A 
number of studies15 show the negative impact of refugee camps on the host 
12 See the various policies of emergency responses at http://www.ifrc.org/who/policy/index.asp
13 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of June 13, 1992, principle 2, The United 
Nations Declaration on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) of June 16, 1972, principle 21, 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of June 5, 1992, article 3, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of December 10, 1982, articles 192-193-194(2), the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) of May 9, 1992 in preamble at paragraph 9, UN Security Council 
resolution S/RES/1483 (2003) in its preamble
14 Stockholm Declaration (supra footnote 13) principle 21, Rio Declaration (supra footnote 13) principle 2, 
the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, ICJ Report 1996, paragraph 29.
15 See in particular UNHCR Refugee Magazine, Issue 127 (2002) and Norman Myers, supra footnote 2.
7environment16. If the environment of a State facing an environmental problem is so 
pressured that it cannot provide the basic needs to the population, thus amounting to a 
threat to life and forcing people to leave their home and seek refuge elsewhere, then in 
many instances the environment of the neighbouring State might be threatened of a 
similar degree of degradation since they may be confronted with the same kind of 
pressure, often being in the same climatic area17. The neighbouring country may be 
unable to assist environmentally displaced persons because hosting refugee camps could 
jeopardize the neighbouring country’s own environmental – not to mention financial –
situation. Therefore, States are, and will be, reluctant to offer protection to those 
migrants. 
The on-going debate about the legal status of to ‘environmental migrants’ 
comprises the determination of the kind of legal protection ‘environmental migrants’ are 
entitled to. The main question is thus: what rights should ‘environmental migrants’ be 
recognized? Should this determination be framed around the refugee status 
determination? Should ‘environmental migrants’ have the possibility to acquire 
permanent status in a host country or should they only be temporarily protected, until 
they can return? One particular aspect of serious environmental degradation is that a 
significant improvement in the situation is generally not to be foreseen in a near future, as 
environmental damages are long to repair, if at all. Would ‘environmental migrants’ 
qualify for the non-refoulement principle or the ‘in need of protection’ test? The non-
refoulement obligation on member States usually does not cover the case of migrants, as 
in the Convention refugee system, it requires the demonstration of a nexus between 
threats on life or freedom and one of the recognized grounds18. The protection against 
refoulement has been explained by the European Court of Human Right as imposing the 
obligation on contracting States to take due account of article 3 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms19 when exercising their right to 
16 For example, in Kagera, Tanzania, UNHCR established that refugees consumed more than 1 200 tons 
wood daily; UNHCR Refugee Magazine, Issue 127 (2002)
17McGregor, JoAnn. Refugees and the Environment in Geography and Refugees: Patterns and Processes of 
Change. Richard Black & Vaughn Robinson Editions, 1993.
18 1951 Convention, supra footnote 25, article 33
19 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950
8control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens on their territory20. Therefore, the 
argument of the right to a level of environment adequate to permitting a “life of dignity 
and well-being”21 as a human right raises the issue of an obligation to offer protection to 
the victims of grave environmental disruption. The lack of a clear definition of the 
content and scope of such a right however constitutes a problem. Indeed, this protection 
is viewed as only relating to breach of fundamental human rights.
These examples demonstrate the complex links between two fields of lex 
specialist of public international law: the international environmental law and the 
international refugee and migration regime. It is important to mention at this point that, 
although there is divergence in the opinions as to which legal status should be afforded to 
environmentally displaced persons, all authors agree that ‘environmental migrants’ are 
not, at the moment, officially recognized in the refugee regime. They receive 
humanitarian aid on a ‘case-by-case’ approach. Furthermore, the majority of the States, 
as well as UNHCR, do not want to see the definition expanded. This translates in a lower 
level of protection for ‘environmental migrants’ since they are not considered differently 
than economic migrants. Scholars and experts thus propose different solutions regarding 
environmentally displaced persons.
Some authors argue that the refugee regime is already capable of encompassing a 
new kind of refugee. In their opinion, the international refugee law, complemented by 
international human rights law, is adequate to address the problem, which therefore 
becomes an issue of State willingness to act. 
Other authors believe that the current refugee regime is unadequate to provide 
sufficient assistance to the ‘environmental migrants’. For them, the solution generally lies 
in the creation of a new instrument designed specifically to address the growing problems 
of environmentally displaced persons. Other proposals to immediately tackle the problem 
are also put forward, such as the creation of a coordinating mechanism to direct all efforts 
20 Case of Hilal v. The United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H. R., March 6, 2001
21 Stockholm Declaration, principle 1 and Rio Declaration, principle 1, supra footnote 13.
9of the international organizations already focusing on providing relief within their 
capacity. 
Keeping in mind the difficulties encountered in international environmental law, 
the need to qualify the scope and content of a right to an acceptable quality of 
environment is important, as it constitutes the first step to paving the way for a new 
convention that needs to take into account the root causes of environmental degradation, 
the extent and consequences of such degradation on persons and a way to provide help to 
those forced to migrate. In the search for a complete solution to this complex problem, 
several approaches can be envisaged. The international community could consider 
whether it wishes to adopt an individual approach in the decision-making process of 
environmental migrant cases or whether it wishes to choose a global assessment method. 
An individual approach would involve an assessment by the host country on a case-by-
case basis, requiring a claimant to demonstrate how a particular environmental situation 
affects him individually and forced his migration. A global assessment of particular 
environmental situations would, on the other hand, have the advantage to lighten the 
administrative burden of individual claims, provide protection to groups of individuals 
that would not have the means to leave their country to claim protection on an individual 
basis but who might still need aid. As poverty is often linked with environmental 
degradation, most ‘environmental migrants’ do not have the mean to travel further than 
the neighbouring country. Moreover, measures could be taken to encourage and compel 
States to deal with environmental degradation, the root causes of migration.
An insight of the forces and weakness of each system will allow a more 
enlightened choice and a more adapted answer to the challenge of environmentally 
induced migration.
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3 Current Positions in Public International Law: Are Environmental 
Migrants Refugees?
While there is an implicit harmony amongst the authors on the complex causes of 
environmental disturbance leading to environmental migration, there is also an on-going 
debate amongst the experts surrounding the use of the term ‘environmental refugee’. The 
combination of the legal term ‘refugee’ with the qualifier ‘environment’ is said to have 
the potential effect of implying a separation in the “political, economic, and 
environmental causes of migration”.22 This, in turn, implies a certain status of protection 
and rights granted to refugees but not to migrants, including environmental migrants.23
Some authors even go further in denouncing the confusion created amongst policy 
makers and governments by a strategic use of this term so as to lead to a crystallization of 
the situation by inducing a fear of a flow of displacements if ‘environmental migrants’ 
were to be recognized as refugees. It is argued that the labeling of ‘environmental 
refugee’ oversimplifies the root-causes triggering migration that “can imply a sphere 
outside politics, (…) which may encourage receiving States to treat the term in the same 
way as ‘economic migrants’ to reduce their responsibility to protect and assist”24. This 
includes the argument that it would diminish the protection for ‘real’ refugees without 
providing further help to environmental migrants25. 
Another group of authors, though agreeing that environmentally displaced persons 
are not refugees in the narrow legal sense, still prefer using the term ‘environmental 
refugee’ for reasons of convenience, specifying it should be understood in the popular 
sense, meaning people forced to move, whether internally or internationally, due to 
environmental causes, rather than in the narrow legal sense of the term26.
22 Supra footnote 17, at p. 158.
23 Schwartz, Michelle Leighton. International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse. 18 
Yale J. Int’l L. 381 1993.
24 Supra footnote 17, at p.162 – view opposed by Bell, Derek R., Environmental Refugees: What Rights? 
Which Duties?, Public Academic Publishers, 2004.
25King, Tracey. Environmental Displacement: Coordinating Efforts to Find Solutions. Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review, volume 18 2006 543.
26 See Norman Myers, supra footnote 2 & Bell, Derek R., supra footnote 24.
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This debate covers a clash of opinions as to the legal status that should be granted 
to ‘environmental migrants’. Two major views can be distinguished: first, the view of 
those who argue that the situation of refugees and of environmentally displaced persons 
is analogous and that the latter should therefore be recognized the refugee status; second, 
the view of those who argue that these migrants do not have a place under the 
international refugee regime. A variety of approaches are taken to arrive to those different 
conclusions. The examination of the different arguments and counter arguments provides 
a better understanding of the problematic points of the inclusion of ‘environmental 
migrants’ in the refugee regime and enables a sounder ground to build a durable solution.
3.1 ‘Environmental Migrants’ Should Be Recognized Refugee Status
Two main trends lead authors to conclude that persons displaced because of 
environmental factors are refugees in the sense of the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees27. This conclusion is achieved either through a liberal interpretation of the 
Convention refugee definition or, for the authors who find that the environmental 
migrants do not ‘fit’ in the definition as such, through the broader human rights aspect. 
This theory pleads for the expansion of the 1951 Convention refugee definition so as to 
include ‘environmental refugees’ in the protection granted by the instrument via its object 
and purpose, as it is considered to be a human rights instrument. 
27 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the 1951 
Convention.
12
3.1.1 Liberal Interpretation of the 1951 Convention
Authors supporting the view that the 1951 Convention refugee definition can be 
interpreted so as to include environmental migrants base their argumentation on the 
assessment of the components of the definition demonstrating the possible inclusion of 
‘environmental migrants’. The following section will therefore discuss briefly each 
criteria of the 1951 Convention definition, reviewing for each of them the common 
understanding in refugee law and the main arguments for the inclusion of environmental 
migrants. 
i) Well-founded fear: This criterion of the definition requests a double assessment 
of the fear of the applicant. Fear being a state of mind, the applicant must demonstrate 
that he, personally, fears the persecution from which he is fleeing. It is underlined in the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status28 that the fear must be individually demonstrated, unless 
practical reasons in emergency lead to the recourse of ‘group determination’ of refugee 
status29. The addition of the qualifier ‘well-founded’ demands that the said fear be 
objectively justifiable or that it be “supported by an objective situation”30 leading a 
‘reasonable person’ to reject her State of origin’s protection. 
Most authors do not dwell upon this criterion since it seems assumed that both the 
subjective and the objective aspects of fear can be demonstrated when faced with 
environmental disruption of a magnitude such as the previously mentioned example of 
Mozambique. Therefore, authors either provide examples of environmental causes or 
resume this criterion by underlining that since “an evaluation of the subjective element
is inseparable from an assessment of the personality of the applicant”31, the surrounding 
conditions and personal background of a claimant must be taken into account in the 
28 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugee; 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1; Geneva, January 1992; hereinafter referred as UNHCR Handbook.
29 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 26, at paragraphs 44-45.
30 Id. at paragraph 38.
31 Id. at paragraph 40.
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assessment of the fear32. Mothers faced with no land to crop and who are starving and 
unable to feed their children, families pushed away from their home either by 
desertification, landlessness or natural catastrophes such as flooding and forced to leave 
every possession behind are examples of situations demonstrating a fear objectively 
prompting a ‘reasonable person’ to migrate, thus rejecting her State of origin’s protection. 
Different factors can serve to explain this rejection of protection: incapacity from the 
State to offer protection or unwillingness from the government, for various reasons, to 
grant such protection (situation of war in the country, discrimination based on race or 
ethnic grounds33). As this issue is intrinsically linked with the persecution criterion, it 
will be further addressed below. 
It can nevertheless be said at this point that persecution circumscribes the type of 
fear which allows the recognition of refugee status. If environment is used as a tool by 
government to persecute, the fear must be related to the environment. In the case of slow 
onset environmental disruption such as desertification and drought, the individual can 
anticipate the coming lack of food. But in cases of acute onset disruption or accident, it 
could be argued that proving the fear, which comprises an element of future prediction as 
a mental state of strong undesirability of infliction of some sort of harm, will be almost 
impossible. The fear, in those situations, will relate to the impact of the environmental 
disruption on the living conditions and other related rights. It will not be a fear of the 
environment per se since not foreseen, but of the management of the situation by the 
government, which might result in the violation of socio-economic rights, and possibly 
basics rights. This aspect of the assessment of fear is rarely examined in detail, leaving 
out a possible way of demonstrating the closer link between the economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
ii) Persecution: Persecution is a concept that can hardly be summarized in a 
simple definition since it depends mostly on the circumstances of each case. This 
criterion is described by the UNHCR Handbook mostly as ‘prejudicial actions or 
32 Kozoll, Christopher. Poisoning the Well: Persecution, the Environment, and Refugee Status. 15 Colo. J. 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 271 2004 at page 280.
33 Id.
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threats’34 subject to a case-by-case assessment35. Persecution must be viewed in light of 
the subjective character of fear, which impacts on the “thresholds for which situations 
migrants (…) consider intolerable and thus reason for flight”36. As worded by the 
UNHCR in the Handbook, “due to variations in the psychological make-up of 
individuals and in the circumstances of each case, interpretations of what amounts to 
persecution are bound to vary”37. Nevertheless, the Handbook concludes that “from 
article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on 
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular 
social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights – for the 
same reasons – would also constitute persecution”38. Adopting a similar approach, the 
European Union Qualification Directive39 defines persecution as a “severe violation of 
human rights”40. Some authors argue that serious threat to life or freedom due to serious 
environmental degradation might amount to persecution where environmental conditions 
can be seen as prejudicial actions or threats41. As persecution doesn’t have a set 
definition, there is place for evolution of the concept. Persecution through violation of 
international economic and social rights is more and more recognized, but is still too 
rigidly applied. Thus the theory of a restriction of persecution to a threat to life or 
freedom by the interpretation a contrario of article 33 of the Convention is getting out of 
date. 
The general view is that persecution must be inflicted by the Sate or its agents or 
“by the local populace (…) if the acts are knowingly tolerated by the authorities”42. The 
Qualification Directive also enlarges the scope of the protection offered by including the 
34 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, paragraphs 51 to 64.
35 Id.
36 Shanmugaratnam, Ragnhild Lund and Kristi Anne Stølen (Eds). In the Maze of Displacement; Conflict 
Migration and Change. Kristiansand: HøyskoleForlaget Norwegian Academic Press, 2003. at p. 183.
37 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, paragraph 52.
38 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, at paragraph 53.
39 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted; hereinafter referred as the Qualification Directive.
40 Id. article 9, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a).
41 Supra footnote 32. at page 283.
42 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, at paragraph 65.
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acts of non-State actors as persecution43. This recognition is based on the duty of the 
State to provide protection to its citizens as a part of its sovereignty. If a State shows 
unable or unwilling to protect the claimant against the alleged persecution or serious 
harm, this will amount to persecution under the Qualification Directive44. Nevertheless, 
the State is presumed to provide such protection if it demonstrates that reasonable steps 
were taken in order to prevent such persecution, steps generally shown through an 
examination of the efficiency of the legal system to detect and prosecute authors of the 
inflicted harm as well as through the availability of legal actions to the claimant45. This 
evolution is of particular relevance in the case of environmental migrants since private 
actors cause the greater part of the environmental degradation leading to displacement. 
Examples of companies destroying the surrounding environment in total impunity are 
abundant46. Whether such impunity is due to a lack of regulations and standards to ensure 
a minimum level of quality of environment, a lack of will to enforce those regulations for 
economic and/or political reasons, or to technical difficulties for the victim of the 
pollution to claim reparation and cessation of the pollution, it might be said that the State 
is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens and often carries a policy of intentional 
ignorance. In cases of environmental harm, the duty to prevent serious harm and 
degradation is of much importance since the process of repairing environmental damages 
is laborious, long and the results mostly uncertain.
It is in the perspective of this duty that omission or failure by the State to protect 
might also amount to persecution. Two possibilities are generally recognized: first, 
generalized attacks against which no protection of the State is provided by reason of one 
of the enumerated grounds, and second discriminated attacks targeting part of the 
population because of one of the recognized ‘grounds’, for which there’s a general 
43 Qualification Directive, supra footnote 39, article 6.
44 Id. article 6.
45 Id. article 7.
46 For instance, the case of Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC in Papua New-Guinea; the many factories surrounding 
township of Yixing (province of Jiangsu, China) and poisoning the Tai Lake; oil drilling and spilling in 
fragile environment such as Alaska; federal government agencies allowing illegal dumping of sediment 
laced with aluminium sulphate into the Potomac River threatening several endangered species in the 
United-States; the Bhopal disaster in India; illegal dumping of toxic waste in Ivory Coast and Africa in 
general; etc.
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absence of protection by the State47. In the case of environmental causes, the omission or 
failure can result from the incapacity of a government to respond to an emergency 
situation after a natural disaster either for reasons of lack of means or political policies 
(as after the Chernobyl accident48), or by its incapacity and unwillingness to enforce 
environmental regulations to protect the living environment of the population as, for 
example, the Brazilian government’s struggle to protect the land of the Yanomami people 
from mining and logging pollution and deforestation, as well as its own development 
program in the Amazon. Nevertheless, a claim of persecution based on the inaction of the 
State or its failure to protect must still show a nexus between the alleged persecution and 
one recognized ground of the definition in the 1951 Convention. Thus, in addition to the 
degree of harm caused by the failure to protect the environment in order to amount to 
persecution, the motive for such failure must also be evaluated. As will be discussed later 
in relation to persecution through violation of socio-economic rights, this requirement is 
one of the main challenges in the situation of ‘environmental migrants’ as it is usually 
argued that governmental failures incidentally affect to a higher degree some 
communities within a population. In this sense, the persecution is not carried out against 
those communities.
Thus ‘environmental persecution’ is defined as occurring “when governments 
knowingly induce environmental degradation and that degradation harms people by 
forcing them to migrate”49. “Knowingly induced” is not confined to the acts or positive 
gestures of a State, but also includes economical or environmental policies which a 
government takes, knowing it will lead to major environmental degradation50. This 
definition of environmental persecution opens the door to arguing that persecution can be 
inflicted through violation of economic and social rights. 
47 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social group” within the 
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/GIP/02/02, 7 May 2002, at paragraph 23
48 See Cooper, Jessica. Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition. 6 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 483 1997-1998 for discussion on Chernobyl management policies resulting in 
persecution.
49 Id. at page 520.
50 Id.
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Some authors draw a parallel between environmental and economic migrants on 
the basis that they are not perceived as fleeing fear of persecution but “as those 
voluntarily leaving their countries based on a calculation of self-interest”51. Although 
economic migrants are not granted refugee status, the UNHCR handbook underlines that 
the assessment of the motive of flight must not be overlooked too quickly only because 
economic motives are involved in the grounds amounting to persecution. It acknowledges 
that “the distinction between economic and political measure in an applicant’s country of
origin is not always clear”52. C. M. Kozoll argues that an analogy with the combined 
political-economical factors can be made with environmental-political ones, thus 
concluding that, “where a direct and specific environmental harm destroys the cultural 
existence of certain peoples, this also may amount to persecution”53. Transposing the 
argument of political motive justifying the inclusion of economic factors on the 
environmental level, the author is careful to remind that a high degree of environmental 
disturbance would be needed:
“It seems likely that for such an individual to meet the definition of 
refugee (…), the individual will have to show severe environmental harm 
that affects the individual in her capacity as a member of a protected 
category to a greater degree than other persons, and that such 
environmental harm either threatens her life or freedom, or is of such 
nature or extent that would reasonably induce fear”54.
The argumentation in favour of the inclusion of economic components in the 
‘political opinion’ ground of persecution is based on the use of the economy as a tool to 
silence political dissent. It was explained in the Otuñez case55 that the fight over lands, 
which was to be considered as an economic factor, had in fact deeper roots of  
“stereotypical socio-political class struggle” thus distinguishing the political causes from 
the economic causes.
51 Supra footnote 32, at page 284.
52 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, at paragraph 63.
53 Supra footnote 32, at page 284.
54 Id.
55 Otuñez-Tursios v. John Ashcroft, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (2002), 303 F. 3rd 
341
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Because of the growing recognition that in certain situations, violation of political 
rights will amount to persecution affecting the claimant’s life less seriously than the level 
required to amount to persecution in the case of socio-economic rights, the usual 
distinction between political and socio-economic rights as resulting in persecution is 
slowly vanishing. Nevertheless, the conception of a weaker enforceability combined to 
the difficulty of determining the occurrence of a violation of socio-economic rights is 
used to argue that persecution through violation of ‘third level’56 rights must result in 
total denial of such a right or in conditions threatening life and freedom. This is based on 
the separation of the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ obligations of a progressive rather than 
immediate application. It is argued that contrary to ‘negative’ obligations, which are of 
immediate application as they are obligations of conduct imposing a duty on the State to 
refrain from infringing a right, ‘positive’ obligations impose a duty to take action, 
implying the expenses of resources thus “underlining their aspirational nature”57. This 
reasoning is based on article 2 of ICESCR which demands States to take steps “with a 
view to achieving progressively” the fulfillment of the rights. Thus, even recognizing that 
States have a minimum ‘core’ duty, the violation of which would result in total denial of 
a given right, it is argued that this progressive implementation renders the determination 
of a violation impossible and leads to a lack of justiciability of the socio-economic rights. 
In an assessment of persecution based on hierarchization of human rights, 
violation is used as an indicator for persecution58. The view that the ICESCR does not 
give rise to obligations of a same nature as of the ICCPR prevents a similar assessment in 
their role as an indicator. This differentiation of role ensues from the differentiation of 
human rights in two categories. 
Recent trends in the interpretation of human rights obligations underline the 
indivisibility of political and socio-economic rights as well as their multi-faceted aspects 
56 According to Hathaway’s hierachisation of obligations connected to human rights and amounting to 
persecution; as explained and cited in Foster, Michelle. International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic 
Rights: Refuge from Deprivation. Cambridge university press, 2007.
57 Id. p.159
58 Hathaway, James. The Law of Refugee Status. Toronto: Butterworths, 1991.
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and support the view of a ‘tripartite typology’ of rights present in all rights in a 
‘multilayered’ fashion59. Thus, in my opinion, the strength of the analogy between 
economic and environmental migrants lies in the type of right violation leading to 
persecution. To limit such analogy by requiring that denial of rights lead to a threat to life 
or freedom results in the introduction of two different thresholds for the consequences of 
violations of political or socio-economical rights, and undermines the analogy. 
Furthermore, having different thresholds for violation of human rights seems inconsistent 
with the preventive aspect of refugee protection, which is a prospective assessment of the 
risks faced by the claimant if returned to the situation he is fleeing. 
iii) ‘for reasons of’: The grounds on which an applicant may argue persecution are 
specified in the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention: “race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion”. This definition being 
exhaustive, environmental motives of migration do not trigger protection as conventional 
refugee. It is specified in the UNHCR Handbook that “the expression ‘owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted’ – for the reasons stated – by indicating a specific 
motive automatically makes all other reasons for escape irrelevant to the definition. It 
rules out such persons as victims of famine or natural disaster, unless they also have well-
founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons stated”60. Environmental migrants 
must therefore show a combination of grounds for persecution comprising one of the 
stated reasons of the definition such as inaction of a government leading to a failure to 
protect indigenous victims of major environmental degradation on racial or ethnic basis. 
In those circumstances, the migrants might have a chance to be recognized as refugees, 
but ‘for reasons of’ race. This is well illustrated by the case of Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, in 
which the territory and way of life of Bougainville’s citizens, in Papua New-Guinea, was 
destroyed by Rio Tinto’s operation of its open pit cooper mine. Building the mine forced 
the displacement of villagers and destroyed rain forests; the dumping of chemical and 
mine product wastes caused serious environmental degradation such as the destruction of 
59 The concept of tripartite typology of rights is explained by M. Foster as a concept that all human rights 
comprise “interdependent duties of avoidance, protection and aid” or, in other words, imposing three 
“levels of obligations on States Parties: the obligation to respect, to protect and to fulfil” (Concept 
elaborated by Asbjørn Eide). Supra footnote 56, at p. 173-174.
60UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, at paragraph 39, emphasis added.
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the flora and fauna of the Jaba River, serious air pollution, annihilation of forest and 
shore fertility, etc. Discriminatory hiring practices and employee treatment by Rio Tinto 
support the allegations that the company’s destruction of the population’s environment, 
which started in the 1960’s, was not an important issue because they were considered 
racially inferior. From the beginning of the operation, the government received 19,1% 
stake of the profit for its cooperation. In 1988, when a violent protest ended up in a 
popular insurrection and closing of the mine, Rio threatened the government to withdraw 
its investment if no actions were taken to remedy the situation. It further supported the 
government’s blockade of the city, which prevented the transport of medicine, clothing 
and other essential supplies, and killed more than 2,000 children61. 
The common position of the authors who interpret the 1951 Convention refugee 
definition as including environmental migrants without any amendment is that they are 
included in the ‘social group’ category. According to the UNHCR:
a particular social group is a group of persons who share a common 
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a 
group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, 
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the 
exercise of one’s human rights62.
This definition by the UNHCR combines both the ‘social perception’ and the 
‘protected characteristics’ approaches. The ‘protected characteristic’ approach requires an 
assessment of the inclusion in a social group based on a characteristic that is innate and 
immutable to the component of the group while the ‘social perception’ approach requires 
an assessment of inclusion in a social group based on a characteristic which is perceived 
by the society or persecutor as the basis of forming a distinct group63. The requirements 
of innate characteristics and of a distinct identity by the surrounding society in the 
assessment of a social group are also cumulative in the Qualification Directive64. 
61 Supra footnote 32, at page 30-31
62 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, at paragraph 11.
63 Id. at paragraph 13.
64 Qualification Directive, supra footnote 39, article 10(1)d).
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Thus, at this point, an assessment of common fundamental characteristics of the 
group is necessary. According to J. B. Cooper, ‘environmental refugees’ constitute “a 
social group composed of persons lacking political power to protect their own 
environment”. This lack of political power distinguishes them from the rest of the 
population, leading the State to carry on policies inducing an environmental degradation 
leading to persecution. The qualification of political power as a protected characteristic 
that is both innate and immutable is highly debatable. Groups and individuals’ political 
power varies according to the government in place, international pressure, rights or 
political policies at stake, etc. Moreover, the nexus attached to persecution for reason of 
membership in a particular social group demands a demonstration that persecution is 
aimed at overcoming that ‘protected characteristic’65. Furthermore, the existence of a 
particular group must have existed before the occurrence of the claimed persecution66. 
Thus, an event affecting more strongly a part of the society does not in itself create a 
social group, even if people affected lack the political power to demand help from the 
government. 
Most authors on the other hand mention the difficulties of distinguishing the root 
causes for migration and, by the same token, for persecution. This dilemma is one of the 
‘breaking-points’ for the inclusion of environmental migrants in the refugee definition. 
iv) Nexus between the persecution and grounds of protection: The terms ‘for 
reasons of’ in the definition of refugee of the 1951 Convention has been interpreted in the 
case law to imply the requirement of a demonstration that the persecution feared by the 
applicant is rooted in one the protected grounds enumerated further in the definition. This 
was explained in Otunez-Tursio v. U.S.A.67 as a requirement that the persecution be “in 
any way related to” one of the grounds recognized by the 1951 Convention. Thus, the 
motive of persecution by the persecutor must be “at least in part” for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
65 Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals Decision In Re Fauziya Kasinga, June 13, 1996, 
35 ILM 1145 (1996) (United States).
66 Bernard Lukwago v. John Ashcroft, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9328.
67 Case of Otunez-Tursio, supra footnote 55.
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Persecution and ‘for reasons of’ criteria are the two main problematic aspects of a 
refugee claim based on environmental disruption. In certain cases, both requirements 
could be satisfied. But the requirement of a nexus between those two criteria makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to grant refugee status generally to ‘environmental migrants’. 
v) Outside the country of nationality: The meaning of nationality in this context 
differs from the one given to the ground for persecution. Here, nationality is to be 
understood in the narrow sense, as referring to citizenship68, as opposed to including 
particular ethnicities or religious, linguistic, cultural communities69. In order for an 
applicant to claim a fear of persecution linked to his country of nationality, it is logical 
that “it should be established that he does in fact possess the nationality of that country”70
since “as long as he has no fear in relation to the country of his nationality, he can be 
expected to avail himself of that country’s protection”71. Thus, in order to avail himself of 
international protection, a refugee has to cross an internationally recognized border. 
vi) Unable or unwilling to avail himself of State’s protection: The unavailability 
of protection to a claimant may result from ‘unability’ or ‘unwillingness’. The refugee’s 
‘unability’ to avail himself of the protection of his country of nationality involves 
circumstances that are beyond the claimant’s reach, either because the State is not in a 
position to offer such protection or because it refuses to grant it to the claimant. Such a 
denial of protection might serve as circumstantial evidence for persecution72. Either way, 
the ‘unability’ will be determined by the circumstances surrounding each case73.
The only motive justifying a Convention refugee claimant’s ‘unwillingness’ to
accept the State’s protection is the fear of persecution. The qualification ‘owing to such 
fear’ follows the same logic as the nationality prerequisite. It would seem contradictory 
68 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, at paragraph 87.
69 Goodwin-Gill, Guy. The Refugee in International Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
at page 45.
70 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, at paragraph 89.
71 Id. at paragraph 90.
72 Id. at paragraph 98.
73 Id. at paragraph 99.
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for a claimant to be willing to avail himself of the protection of his country of origin 
while claiming international protection against persecution of that country. Hence, 
“whenever the protection of the country of nationality is available, and there is no ground 
based on well-founded fear for refusing it, the person concerned is not in need of 
international protection and is not a refugee”74. 
As underlined by the UNHCR handbook, this criterion is intrinsically linked to 
the notion of persecution and its fear. Since most causes of environmental migration are 
due to negligent governmental policies or to a failure of the country of origin to offer 
protection, this criterion is usually not seen as problematic in the literature pertaining to 
‘environmental refugees’.
3.1.2 The ‘Broader Human Rights Aspect’ Argument
After assessing the criteria of the 1951 Convention refugee definition, a majority 
of authors conclude that environmental migrants do not meet the requisite requirements 
of article 1A of the Convention. Nevertheless, some argue that environmental migrants 
should still be offered protection because they face a situation of desperation and 
helplessness similar to that of refugees. These authors argue that there should be an 
expansion of the definition so as to make it consistent with the object and purpose of the 
Convention, on the basis of article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties75. 
Supporters of this view generally put forward the history of the creation of the 
1951 Convention and of the evolution that made it a major human rights instrument. The 
mandate given by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to the special Ad Hoc 
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems to draft an instrument implementing 
and giving effect to articles 14 and 15 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights76
74 Id. at paragraph 100.
75 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969.
76 UN GA/RES/217 A (III) Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948.
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(UDHR) resulted in the 1951 Convention77. The chronology of events demonstrates that 
the Convention was adopted not long after the UDHR and not long before the 
complementary Covenants78. Furthermore, the Convention is drafted as a typical human 
rights convention, first defining the terms and scope of application and then enumerating 
the rights granted to those covered.  
In analyzing the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention, the reference, in the 
preamble, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the inclusion in the Convention 
refugee definition of basic human rights as ‘reasons of’ persecution, and the principle of 
non-refoulement constitute the main arguments to conclude that it constitutes a human 
rights instrument. 
Authors follow with an assessment of the right to an appropriate environment as a 
human right. One of the main paths to recognize environmental rights the status of 
human rights is to establish a link between environmental degradation and its impact on 
an established fundamental human right (such as right to life and to freedom)79. As to 
environmental instruments per se, the main dispositions are contained in the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development80 and in the Stockholm Declaration81, 
which are both soft law instruments. The principles set out in the Declarations are read in 
conjunction with article 25 of the UDHR establishing a “right to a standard of living 
adequate (…), including food, clothing, housing and medical care”, articles 11 and 12 of 
the ICESCR further developing the right to a decent standard of living through 
environmental improvements, and article 47 of the ICCPR addressing the right of 
utilization of natural resources. Although the right to a healthy environment seems 
recognized, its content and threshold are still to be defined82. 
77 McAdam, Jane. Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press [monographs in international law], 2007. 283 pp.
78 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966.
79 Supra footnote 23, at page 359
80 The Rio Declaration, supra footnote 13, Principle 1. 
81 The Stockholm Declaration, supra footnote 13, Principle 1.
82 Supra footnote 23, at page 363-364.
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After a demonstration of the potentiality of environmental law as a human right, 
the analogy is drawn between the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention as a human 
rights instrument and the need to encompass environmental issues of migration in the 
protection offered.
It is unfortunate that authors do not link the right to environmentally sound 
conditions of living with other socio-economic rights. Such an analogy, as discussed 
above, would complement and reinforce the object and purpose approach, as States are 
reluctant to expand the scope of obligations under the Convention.
3.2 ‘Environmental Migrants’ Do Not Qualify for Refugee Status
Another group of authors addressing the issue of environmentally displaced 
persons do not consider ‘environmental migrants’ to be included in the international 
refugee regime. After analyzing the 1951 Convention refugee definition criteria, they 
conclude that the text cannot be interpreted as comprising the eventuality of 
environmentally displaced persons. The two criteria seen as preventing such a 
qualification are, for the majority, the recognized grounds of persecution and the notion 
of environmental disruption as amounting to persecution. I will briefly explain why these 
authors perceive those two criteria as being obstacles to the inclusion of environmentally 
displaced persons in the definition. Counterarguments for the view of including 
environmental migrants in the scope of the 1951 Convention protection through the 
‘broader human rights aspect’ will follow. 
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3.2.1 Arguments Against a Liberal Interpretation of the 1951 Convention
i) Persecution: Even when faced with serious environmental degradation that 
might reach a degree which poses threats to life, ‘environmental migrants’ are not 
considered persecuted since the governments do not intentionally carry a persecution83. 
An element of mens rea is thus seen a necessary component of persecution. 
‘Environmental migrants’ are therefore seen as being able to “usually count on the 
protection of their State, even if it is limited in its capacity to provide them with 
emergency relief or longer-term reconstruction assistance”84. Commenting on the 
possibility that omission or failure by the State to act might amount to persecution with a 
nexus based on ‘particular social group’, D. Z. Falstrom points out that such a connection 
would require a causal connection of too high a degree to ever realistically happen85. 
This argumentation seems to recognize the possibility of a level of harm sufficient 
to constitute persecution through environmental means, but suggests that the lack of the 
mens rea element prevents the qualification of the threat feared as persecution in the legal 
sense of the term as applied to refugees. It ensues that the persecution criterion is divided 
in two components: first, a minimum necessary level of harm, and second an intent to 
persecute. This point of view goes against the generally accepted principle that intent is 
not relevant in the assessment of persecution even if it can serve as evidence to show a 
nexus86. In addition to blurring the relevant component of each criterion, the inclusion of 
means rea in the persecution assessment also results in the imposition of a higher degree 
of nexus between the persecution and the protected ground as it requires an ‘act’ to be 
‘carried out’ by the government. 
83 See Falstrom, Dana Zartner. Stemming the Flow of Environmental Displacement: Creating a Convention 
to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment. 13 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 1 2002 and supra
footnote 25 for further discussion.
84 Position supported by Tracey King, supra footnote 25 and Dana Z. Falstrom, supra footnote 83, both 
citing the UNHCR publication The State of the World’s Refugees, 
www.unhcr,ch/refworld/pub/state/97/box1_2.htm
85 Supra footnote 83 at page13.
86 Pitcherskaia v. INS, No. 95-70887, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 118 F 3rd. 641, 
June 24, 1997.
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It is unfortunately in this trend that the concept of persecution through 
interference with socio-economic rights evolves. The recognition as a violation of those 
rights as possibly constituting persecution is growing but it is still rigidly applied. The 
attempt to enlarge the scope of potential sources of persecution remains linked to the 
conceptual frame that persecution must constitute an ‘act’ over the individual, which 
comes close to the ‘single out’ ideology, focusing on the physical harm done to the 
individual as well as on the “breaking of the relationship between the State and the 
claimant”, which makes the individual either unable or unwilling to avail himself of his 
country’s protection. That frame is the main obstacle to expanding the recognition of 
violations of socio-economic rights beyond necessarily threatening life or freedom or 
beyond the required ‘complete denial’ of rights, which is defined as a refusal to grant and 
thus an ‘act’ of the government. In that sense, failure is seen as the decision to take no 
action or the willful ignorance more akin to negligence than simple failure. This view is 
usually justified by the argument that it is impossible to determine the occurrence of a 
violation of socio-economic rights on the basis of the progressive achievement 
argumentation and sovereignty of States in the allocation of their resources. 
ii) ‘for reasons of”: The grounds of persecution recognized as granting 
Convention refugee protection are exhaustive. It should be reminded that the only 
possible way to include ‘environmental migrants’ in the 1951 Convention definition is by 
demonstrating that they constitute a ‘social group’. Such a qualification is found 
impossible on the basis that “they do not have the immutable characteristic required to 
provide refugee status under the existing definition”87. Being a victim of the same 
environmental disruption does not include the intrinsic element required to constitute a 
social group, according to D. Z. Falstrom. She furthermore responds to the view 
expressed by J. B. Cooper, stating that “political powerlessness is not an immutable 
characteristic that will make a person or a group of persons members of a particular 
social group”88. The American court of Appeal has also stated in Bernard Lukwago v. 
87 Supra footnote 83, at page 11.
88 Supra footnote 83, at page 13.
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U.S.A.89 that the particular social group must have existed before the persecution began in 
order to create a presumption of persecution based on past persecution and that can be 
used as evidence to demonstrate the well-foundedness of fear of future persecution, a 
situation which does not exist in the majority of examples of environmentally induced 
migration.
3.2.2 Arguments Against the ‘Broader Human Rights’ Aspect Argument
According to M. L. Schwartz, the conjunction of certain cases90 could support the 
assertion that States have an obligation to protect their citizens from situations within 
their jurisdiction that are likely to imperil their life. The difficulties do not arise from the 
principle of environment as a human right, but from its content. Schwartz underlines that, 
although such a right has been recognized by some courts, these cases “did not clearly 
delineate the scope of these rights”, thus leaving the interpretation of such right 
uncertain91 which, in turn, precludes the use of the object and purpose argument in order 
to expand the scope of recognition of refugee status to ‘environmental migrants’.
Foster argues that interdependency and inseparability of rights is such that the 
assessment of the violation of one right alone should be enough to amount to 
persecution92. This reasoning follows Hathaway’s theory of the human rights violation as 
an indicator of persecution on the scheme of hierarchization of obligations. Combined 
with the repeated notion of intertwined root causes of migration, it should be argued that 
the right to environment is inseparable from the other rights as it serves as their context. 
Thus, even if not as developed and precise in its content, it should be used in conjunction 
with other human rights. If the causes are intertwined, then the rights affected will also 
be. One problem with the assessment of Foster is that she mostly uses the examples of 
violation of economic rights in a State controlled economy, again incorporating a 
89Supra footnote 66.
90 The author makes an assessment of the Vasquez Rodriguez case, Inter. Am. Ct. H. R. 1988, App. VI, at 
70-71, OAS/Ser.L/V/III.19, doc.13 (Aug. 31, 1988) and of Soering v. United-Kindom, 161 Eur. Ct. H. R. 
(ser.1)(1989). See supra footnote 23 at pages 362-363.
91 Supra footnote 23, at page 363-364.
92 Supra footnote 56, at page 105.
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requirement of an ‘act’ to the notion of persecution, thus not really encompassing the idea 
of failure to protect.
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4 Choice of Approaches to Decision-Making Process
Poverty, population growth, economic and political factors, corruption, 
environmental degradation, education, health problems, etc. all have a circular impact on 
each other to bring situations to unbearable levels of problems triggering migration. The 
difficulty or, according to certain authors, the impossibility to dissociate causes of 
migration because of the intertwining factors of livelihood degradation must be kept in 
mind in designing a new international instrument. Drafters of a convention for the 
individual assessment of environmentally displaced people should avoid setting too rigid 
a definition of the 'environmental migrant' or circumscribing too narrowly situations 
giving rise to the duty to provide help.
Such duty needs to be complemented by a method of assigning the States’ 
respective responsibilities. A determination of circumstances which would bind the 
international community as a whole, yet leave member States free to divide among 
themselves the duties towards environmental migrants would not effectively solve the 
problem. It would more or less resemble the present situation. 
The adoption of an instrument is useless if it is not observed. In that sense, the 
elaboration of an international instrument and of the obligations it contains is only the 
first step towards the resolution of the issue. Proper implementation and compliance is 
another important stage. Report mechanisms, sanctions and incentives are of course 
important tools to ensure compliance but, as put by R. Mitchell, “the simplest 
explanation of why a government or other actor regulated by a treaty undertakes a given 
behaviour is because they believe it furthers their interest”93. Therefore, the adoption of 
obligations that would be deemed too burdensome would not further the cause of 
‘environmental migrants’. On the other hand, the adoption of diluted obligations would 
not improve their situation on a practical level. Thus, in the elaboration of the new 
93 Zaelke, Durwood, Kaniaru, Donald & Kružíková, Eva (Eds). Making Law Work; Environmental 
Compliance & Sustainable Development. London: Cameron May International Law & Policy, 2005. at 
page 85.
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convention, the obstacles retaining most States to act at present need to be identified and 
evaluated in order to prevent reasons for non-compliance.
Most developed countries funding aid through international organizations fear a 
flow of migration94 and are concerned about high levels of direct aid funding obligations 
arising out of international law95. But there is a consensus that the elaboration of 
environmental solutions assessing the root causes of migration would help avoiding those 
problems. Already in 1993, the President of the Climate Institute in Washington stated “if 
the developed nations truly want to protect themselves from massive refugee flows and 
aid expenditures, the sensible response is to address the problem now by recognizing 
long-term trends”96.  
As appealing as the formulation of obligations in a manner similar to the current 
refugee regime sounds, environmental migration is deeper rooted and its causes are 
complex to pinpoint. An answer modelled on fixed circumstances such as those 
prevailing in the refugee regime would not encompass the whole problem, but would at 
the best provide a temporary solution, pushing its resolution in time. On the other hand, 
even in cases where environment could be isolated as the specific cause for migration, 
difficulties related to international environmental law (IEL) remain, notably identifying 
the State or actor responsible for an environmental damage. IEL being part of public 
international law (PIL) and therefore having a responsibility regime based on the balance 
of probability standard, liability is highly problematic. Moreover, the standard is 
heightened in this specific field by an inflated threshold of proof dependent on the 
provision of sufficient scientific evidence to fulfil such standard. This obstacle constitutes 
one of the elements which prevent attributing liability for a migration trend arising from 
an environmental damage to one specific State, therefore precluding the imposition of 
reparation either through funding, through in situ restoration of the environment to its 
original level of quality or through the resettlement on its territory of the displaced 
persons.
94 Supra footnote 6 and supra footnote 17.
95 Supra footnote 6.
96 Interview of G. McCue with John Topping in March 1993, supra footnote 6, at page 177.
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As both systems are, at the moment, unfit to deal with ‘environmental migrants’, 
the need for a complete solution enhances the importance of the decision-making method 
in the search of a durable solution. The determination and creation of specific duties on 
the basis of environmental and human rights or a standard or model designed specifically 
for environmental migration is surely a decision of prime importance. But in order to be 
efficient, an instrument must anticipate the potential obstacles to its practical use, 
affecting States’ compliance. As both refugee and environmental fields of law are mostly 
translated in administrative law at the national level and depend on efficient 
implementation, the assessment of standards of proof, including modes of evidence, as 
well as of principles elaborated in order to overcome the specific challenges of both 
regimes in the granting of protection will help gain a broader perspective on their 
respective strengths and weaknesses and provide a better context to decide on this issue. 
4.1 Individual decision-making approach
The assessment of an individual claim presented by an ‘environmental migrant’ to 
authorities outside his country of origin under the new instrument would require the 
claimant to show that he personally meets the criteria for the protection offered by the 
instrument. In order to claim entitlement to the obligations and duties triggered by the 
convention, the claimant would need to show that the environmental situation is 
particularly affecting him to the level of the pre-established threshold.
As an individual approach would be similar to a claim based on the refugee 
model, an assessment of the potential difficulties of environmental law cohabitating with 
the refugee law decision-making process is necessary to avoid creating obstacles in the 
new instrument. 
In assessing this potential impact of IEL on an asylum claim, the standard of 
proof must be distinguished from the necessary evidence one needs to demonstrate in 
order to satisfy such standard. The former relates to the threshold to meet in order to get 
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recognition of a status, either as a Convention refugee or as a victim of a breach of an 
obligation, and the latter relates to the evidence pertaining to the elements needed to 
fulfill the said threshold.
4.1.1 Well-Founded Fear
It is a generalized standard in law that the burden of proving a claim lies with the 
claimant. One particularity of asylum claim is the sharing of this burden between the 
applicant and the authorities of the host country97. This particularity would also likely 
apply in the environmental migrant regime. To better understand this repartition of 
burden, it may be useful to distinguish the burden of persuasion from the burden of 
providing evidence98. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the term “well-founded fear” implies a subjective and 
objective assessment. This twofold aspect of the fear often divides the burden of 
producing the evidence between the claimant and the host country decision-making 
agency 
The subjective component of the assessment is contained in the element of fear 
constituting the state of mind felt by the claimant. Thus, he has the burden of producing 
evidence to satisfy the decision-maker of the existence of a fear which is reasonable. Due 
to the particularity of this intrinsically personal criteria and the difficulty to prove a state 
of mind, the testimony of the claimant will be sufficient to prove that element if found 
credible by the decision-maker. Inclusion of the personality of the applicant in the 
determination of the existence of such fear99 keeps its relevance in the case of 
environmentally displaced persons as not all individual have the same threshold of 
resistance in face of environmental degradation or disaster. 
97 UNCHR Handbook, supra footnote 28, at paragraph 196.
98 Zahle, Henrik. Evidentiary Assessment. in Noll, Gregor (Ed). Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and 
Credibility in Asylum Procedures. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers [ The Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute Human Rights Library], 2005. 233pp.
99 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, paragraph 40-41.
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In order to be well-founded, the fear alleged in the refugee regime requires the
existence of an objective risk that the applicant would be persecuted if returned to his 
country of origin. Because “the feared persecution must be based on a factual situation 
that makes the fear reasonable”100, it must be evaluated in light and on the basis of the 
available information on the situation prevailing in the country of origin. Due to his 
particular situation, the applicant is generally incapable of providing corroborating 
information. This burden is therefore taken on by the authorities, who have access to 
reports of governments, delegations and NGOs as well as to political information. The 
main assessment being the fear felt by the applicant, the information provided by the host 
country State agent to assess its well-foundedness should have a complementary role, 
serving as a supplementary and perhaps counter purpose101. 
‘Environmental migrants’ find themselves in the same vulnerable situation as 
asylum seekers. Thus, the motives for the sharing of burden of proof, namely that the 
claimant does not have access to documentation and means of proof, is analogous if not 
increased. Even with an easier access to basic environmental data, such as information on 
catastrophes and disaster, gathering and mostly understanding and conveying the 
consequences of the circumstances described in such data, will in most cases be above 
the capacity of the average claimant, as even scholars and politicians establishing the 
standard can hardly predict consequences of environmental damage. Thus, the sharing of 
the burden of proof stays highly relevant as authorities not only have access to reports 
from departments and embassies as well as from NGOs and other organizations on the 
field, but they also have access to more specific information within the framework of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) containing obligations of research and 
information-sharing through the Secretariat102, and more confidential information on the 
environmental impact of private actors based on national legislation (such as the means 
100 Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. ex parte Sivakumar, [2003] UKHL 14.
101 Position supported by Zahle, Henrik, supra footnote 98.
102 Such as World Charter for Nature, paragraph18, Stockholm Declaration,supra footnote 13, principle 20, 
UNCLOS, supra footnote 13, articles 119(2), 200-202; FCCC, supra footnote 13, article 4(1)(h); CDB, 
supra footnote 13, articles 14(1)(c) and 17; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 
Marc 22, 1985, article 2(2)(a) and its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
article 7 and 9.
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of disposal of waste, the nature and quantity of the toxins, fumes and others release, 
results of impact assessment carried on, etc.). Furthermore, the parties may retain the 
services of experts to explain the impact of scientific data as well as its potential link and 
combined effects. The possibility of a neutral international body making the assessment 
of situation of environmental disruption leading to international protection will be further 
discussed below. 
The burden of persuasion completes the burden of proof in determining the level 
of evidence the parties have to present in order to meet the threshold of the standard of 
proof. This leads to the question of what evidence is needed to objectively demonstrate 
that the claimed fear is well-founded. 
In a regime applicable to environmental migrants, just as in the case of 
Convention refugee claimants, the applicant’s statement will be the starting point of the 
assessment of the well-foundedness of the alleged fear103. Thus, the principles relating to 
the assessment of Convention refugee claims could apply to claims filed by 
environmental migrants under a new convention. In order to qualify a statement as 
credible, one must replace it in the broader context of a communication process between 
the decision maker and the applicant. In such process, the decision-maker must make 
abstraction of his own cultural references and traditions to evaluate the trustworthiness of 
the applicant and accept that he may not fully understand certain behaviors without it 
necessarily amounting to an incredible statement. Moreover, the decision-maker is to 
assess the veracity of facts presented to him by an applicant pleading his own cause, in a 
context where the usual tools to assess credibility are lacking104. The difficulty of 
determining the tolerable amount of inconsistencies leads to suggest that the decision-
maker, in its assessment, “should be open to trust not only tragic but even surprising 
statements that are not without discrepancies”105. This acceptance of facts beyond the 
scope of comprehension of the decision-maker plays a major role in environmental 
103 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, paragraph 37 and 195.
104 Zahle, supra footnote 98, quotes namely the “repetitive experiences with the person at hand”, a broader 
familiar context, and situations relating to a known pattern, at p.16
105 Zahle, supra foonote 98, at page18.
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assessment. The understanding of a chain of effects in such a scientific based field has 
shown to be a challenge in other areas of international law where decision makers had to 
evaluate evidence presented by environmental experts. That issue is, for example, 
problematic in adjudication of claims pertaining to the environmental exception in the 
GATT106 as the panel and appellate body of the World Trade Organization are composed 
mostly of trade experts. In a context of communication as the one in refugee law, this 
difficulty would either require the decision-making panel to have an expertise in 
environment and scientific data analysis and an acceptance of facts that could be 
uncertain and shocking. 
At the stage where the claimant is deemed credible, and because of the difficulty 
of obtaining corroborating documents and testimonies concerning the claimant’s personal 
situation, the concept of ‘benefit of the doubt’, imported in asylum adjudication, might 
also apply to ‘environmental’claimants. It has been adapted by leading to the “acceptance 
of applicant’s statements which (…) might under other conditions raise doubt”107. It is the 
‘benefit of the doubt’ that gives the credible and reliable statement status of sufficient 
proof. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, fear of harm or hardship in an environmental context 
is a very difficult assessment. Containing an element of undesirability of a future 
situation, the emotion of fear has to be well-founded or, in other words, consistent to 
what a ‘rational and objective man’ in the same situation would feel. With regard to 
environment, where the consequences of slow onset disruption are disputed, and with the 
unforeseeable character of certain acute onset disruptions and the difficult analysis of the 
impact of foreseeable environmental damage, how is it possible to prove an objectively 
well-founded fear? 
4.1.2 Serious Hardship
106 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades, as of 1994.
107 Zahle, supra footnote 98, at page 18.
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As explained in Chapter 2, persecution, in refugee law, takes many forms and is 
highly dependant of a case-by-case analysis. Some common criteria have been 
demonstrated to, at least, sketch a delimitation of what may constitute persecution and its 
means of proof. At this point, the question is not so much what constitutes persecution as 
to what level of harm is necessary in order to amount to persecution. The question is the 
same with regard to the level of harm required to trigger ‘environmental migrant’ 
protection. 
As for the well-founded fear, the threshold of persecution in refugee law cannot 
be formulated mathematically, often taking the form of phrasing such as to “what a 
reasonable person would deem offensive”108. This might be explained by the informal 
presence of a subjective aspect in the assessment of this objective criterion since the 
threshold of each individual to cope and endure pain, sufferance, threats, and harm, be it 
because of persecution or because of environmental damage, will vary. In that sense, V. 
Vevstad underlines, in her discussion of persecution as a violation of human rights, the 
more difficult issue arising from the violation of those rights which are neither seen as 
fundamental nor non-derogable, concluding on the example of harassment that “it is 
often difficult to determine when ‘harassment’ becomes ‘persecution’, and is therefore 
one area in which States tend to set a too high threshold on the interpretation of what 
constitutes persecution”109. This is certainly true in the case of environmental disruption. 
Even with the increasing recognition of decent environment as a human right, it has not 
reached the level of recognition as a possible source of persecution as harassment. It may 
therefore be inferred that the threshold of environmental degradation necessary to amount 
to persecution be unrealistically high to effectively deal with the problem. Even in the 
growing trend recognizing violation of socio-economic rights as potentially amounting to 
persecution, as discussed above, persecution is nonetheless a concept that does not seem 
apt to delimit environmental situations justifying the displacement of migrants. In opting 
for the creation of a new instrument to effectively encompass the variety of sources of 
migration due to environmental disruption, a concept of wider application seems 
108 Pitcherskaia case, supra footnote 86.
109 Vevstad, Vigdis. Refugee Protection; A European Challenge. The Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998. at 
page 70.
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required. Thus, it could be established that the claimant needs to demonstrate a fear of 
‘serious hardship’ on his conditions of living, work, health, resources, etc. caused by 
environmental disruption. 
In that sense, the special situation of civil war is worth mentioning because it 
shares some similarities with the context of vast environmental disruptions triggering 
migration flux. The threshold of harm amounting to persecution will rise in the civil war 
context as a minimal level of suffering must be expected by the population from the 
general situation of conflict110 since all individuals affected face similar misfortune and 
the whole population could therefore be considered as a victim. The need for 
discrimination in the infliction of the persecution can be drawn from this reasoning 
leading to the need of showing a “differential impact” or a “fear of persecution above 
ordinary risks of clan warfare”111. This particular situation, which is due to the general 
chaos prevailing in time of war, is similar to most of environmental disruption triggering 
migration in the sense that the victims are not ‘selected’ for persecution by tsunamis, 
desertification, global warming and rise of sea level, famine, drought, natural 
catastrophes, etc. Thus, in cases where natural catastrophes or environmental degradation 
affect a whole population, an individual approach would require the claimant to 
demonstrate that he fears ‘serious hardship’ of a higher degree than the minimal level 
expected to be tolerable in such a situation. 
110 Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Ex Parte Adan, United Kingdom House of 
Lords, 19 December 2000.
111 Id.
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4.1.3 Grounds of ‘serious hardship’
The nature of the causes of environmental migration will affect parts of the 
population globally in the sense that, as mentioned above, it does not select individuals. It 
might then be said that the affected region will create a group that might potentially 
suffer ‘serious hardship’. Thus, a claimant alleging serious hardship would have to 
demonstrate its membership in this group. 
In refugee case law, social group is subject to criteria ensuring the particularity of 
a group and the belonging of the claimant to this group. The applicant basing his claim of 
persecution on this ground must demonstrate three basic elements: first, he must identify 
a particular group as constituting a ‘social group’ in conformity with the ‘protected 
characteristics’ and ‘social perception’ criteria. In this assessment, the special situation of 
the applicant must be kept in mind, allowing an analogy with the shared burden of 
provision of evidence for the well-founded fear and, thus, allowing the identification of a 
particular social group to be based on the testimony of the applicant, complemented by 
the general situation and information available to the authorities. The assessment of the 
‘seriously affected group’ could be inspired of this model, requiring the claimant to 
identify as a member of a group that suffers ‘serious hardship’ based on his testimony 
that should be supported by the information available pertaining to the situation. As in a 
refugee claim, no requirement of cohesiveness or of effective association amongst the 
members of the group would be necessary112. 
Finally, the migrant would need to show that the ‘serious hardship’ he encounters 
is attributable to environmental degradation. Such nexus, at first quite similar to the one 
present in refugee context, would encompass the negative effects of environmental 
disruption on living conditions and would thus be as wide as the ‘serious hardship’ 
criteria in its application. 
112 UNHCR Handbook, supra footnote 28, paragraph 15.
40
4.2 Global Assessment Basis Approach to Decision-Making
Because only a fraction of victims of environmental situations can be 
expected to be able to reach out to international protection on an individual basis, the 
international community could also envisage to design, either as an alternative or as a 
complementary solution, an international framework for providing assistance to 
populations who face severe hardship due to environmental damage or catastrophes. At 
present, States contribute to reconstruction after environmental disasters on a case-by-
case basis, but given the common responsibility of industrialized States for degradation 
of the environment, a more structured and binding approach should be planned.
An assessment based on specific environmental situations would come 
close to a decision based on environmental law as it would concern itself with a particular 
situation of environmental disruption and its impact on the population. Many issues 
would need to be discussed in such a context, such as the rights of victim populations, the 
obligations and duties of States and the sharing of those duties. In order to enlighten a 
reflection on a approach to adopt, three main issues may be examined, namely a) the 
means of qualification of a situation giving rise to the international assistance; b) the 
method of assessment of the group qualifying for protection; and c) the host country, as 
the case may be, as well as the international sharing of the responsibilities towards a 
given group. 
4.2.1 Situation Assessment
Situations qualifying for international protection could be divided into slow onset 
environmental degradation, and sudden environmental disruption. The predetermined 
characteristics of situations triggering application of the instrument would have to be 
broad enough and easily modifiable through an efficient amending system in order to 
allow it to evolve and adapt to environmental evolution. The fulfilling of the established 
criteria would further need to be assessed on the international level by an impartial body 
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to legitimately impose obligations without too many risks of dispute. This role could be 
played by the Conference of the Parties (COP), which could also have the power to make 
proposals for amendments, since it would be best placed to see the difficulties 
encountered. In this sense, COPs usually have vast powers to ensure the good functioning 
of the MEA in question113. 
An objective assessment of situations by the impartial body would require 
objective criteria. As it was mentioned above and repeatedly addressed in the literature 
pertaining to environmentally triggered migration, the challenge of such an assessment 
lies mostly in the intertwined causes of displacement. Thus, the links between all relevant 
factors must be kept in mind in the adjudication of which situations require help and 
protection. The parameters of a ‘disruption threshold’ could therefore be based in part on 
the already existent various indexes of special UN agencies and other specialized 
organizations, such as the World Bank. Most of them are already compiled for the 
purpose of serving the millennium development goal data indicators114. 
Some situations leading to displacement are, and might continue to be, caused by 
governmental policies115. Thus, the convention should specify if the affected country’s 
government approval be necessary in order to intervene. If so, the humanitarian theory 
pleading loss of sovereignty in cases of major human right violations on the basis of the 
incapacity of governmental protection could be transposed to environmental degradation 
situations in order to justify intervention; however, this theory needs to be more 
universally accepted. The sovereignty barrier is at the basis of the weak enforcement of 
international economic, social and cultural rights and at the foundation of the argument of 
‘progressive achievement’ to justify the discretionary management of resources. 
113 When the MEA does not explicitly grant such power to the COP by a residual catchphrase such as the 
one present in FCCC, supra footnote 13, article 2(m) and CBD, supra footnote 13, article 23(4)(i) 
“Consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of 
this Convention in the light of the experience gained in its operation”, MEAs usually grant vast powers 
such as to adopt its own rule of procedure, protocol, budget, amendments, annexes, and establish subsidiary 
bodies.
114 http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/default.aspx ; see annex 1 for a list of the indicators and of the 
organizations providing data. 
115 Such as deforestation, development projects, non-implementation of very low level of environmental 
regulation, etc.
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Although this trend of interpretation is slowly overturning, clarification of such theory, or 
at least its recognition, would be an improvement and surely avoid many potential 
problems. A wider recognition could enable the COP to determine when a situation 
reached the level of disruption amounting to a loss of sovereignty, calling for intervention 
and international assistance. 
4.2.2 Group Determination
The identification of a particular group being closely linked with the 
determination of the qualification of a situation, such assessment could be made by the 
COP simultaneously with the situation determination process. 
The demonstration of the membership in the affected group raises the issue of 
determining how such a decision would be made. Would such an assessment be made in 
the country of origin, before departure with humanitarian aid getting migrants to 
destination or would it be a frontier decision where each migrant would be required to 
show he belongs to such a group and is a victim of the situation? This latter option is 
quite similar to an individual assessment with group criteria, thus not really lightening the 
administrative burden, one of the main advantages of a group situation assessment. In a 
group assessment approach, one possibility would be for the migrants to simply present 
themselves at one designated office (e.g. at a UNHCR camp or government base) and 
show they possess the nationality. 
To identify migrants solely seeking economic opportunities, States might still 
want to impose parameters demanding that migrants demonstrate the relationship 
between their migration or displacement and the environmental situation prevailing. 
Attention should be given not to slip back in the refugee closed compartmental model of 
the nexus requirement, unduly restraining protection because of a fear of a flow of 
migration. This recurrent fear is also as the basis of the hesitancy to accept 
‘environmental migrant’ on a State territory. As mentioned above, the impact of refugee 
camps can have disastrous consequence, which is one of the reasons States are reluctant 
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to take them in. However, particularly in situations of sudden environmental disruption 
where migrants often loose all possessions, the identification with certainty of certain 
migrant will be almost impossible and, thus, they should be granted the benefit of the 
doubt after certain verification. 
4.2.3 Host Country and International Responsibilities
In the refugee regime, the country where the claim is made will generally assess it 
and become the host country of the refugee if the request is granted. Although certain 
principles redirect the asylum seeker in given situations116, it can be said that the refugee 
‘chooses’ his country of refuge as opposed to cases of massive displacement of 
population, such as in the Iraqi and Sudanese conflicts, where the neighboring countries 
usually accept the setting up of refugee camps on their territory. 
The nature of environmental migration being more similar to those massive 
displacements of population situation, the transposition of the situation usually draws a 
picture of the arrival on the territory of a great number of migrants. Such an assumption 
constitutes one fear at the basis of current inaction. Since such mass arrival of population 
is quite improbable in countries other than the neighbours of the State of departure, the 
burden could be composed of different obligations. Neighboring countries will likely not 
be able to assume responsibility for all migrants, as some regions are more prone to 
environmental migration than other. Poverty being a root cause of environmental 
migration, the countries most affected, and thus their neighbours, will often be countries 
who lack the means to take charge. The obligation of receiving migrants could be taken 
on by one State while others’ could be the provision of help through other means, as for 
example the funding of resettlement reconstruction in host countries. Furthermore, the 
116 Principle of third safe country and first country of arrival, as opposed to country of transit, present in EU 
directives as well as “take back” and “take charge” mechanisms present in the Council Directive 
2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted (Dublin II Regulation).
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administrative burden attached to migration could also be shared through financial 
contribution and technical cooperation.
The designation of a specific country receiving migrants who flee a given 
situation could be based on a voluntary basis complemented by a responsibility 
mechanism. To avoid a solution tainted with the import of international environmental 
law liability, a special internal regime of strict environmental liability could be 
established to help overcome the problem of remoteness of liability by reducing the 
threshold of causal link needed between a given environmental degradation and a breach 
of a State’s obligation in order to establish a fault and, thus, a State’s responsibility. In 
this sense, the system could be based on the prevention principle to diminish the negative 
impacts of the principle of sovereignty of States in order to limit the damages that a State 
could theoretically carry on its own territory. Following the logic that prevention is better 
than cure, this principle requires that action be taken at an early stage to prevent damages 
to the environment, prohibiting activities or actions contrary to standards and norms of 
international law. Therefore, it might impose to a State the obligation to prevent from 
damaging its own environment and thus, come to limit the principle of sovereignty over 
natural resources that may otherwise lead to excess and cause global damages117. Such a 
principle would also press on the implementation of the socio-economic rights, as it 
would concern international community before the total denial or a degradation of the 
situation to a point of no return.
The elaboration of such a system could furthermore serve as an incentive to 
comply with the environmental obligations contained in the convention. A report 
mechanism following the implementation and compliance with the different types of 
obligations contained in the new convention could use different kinds of incentive. Non-
compliance with a ‘negative’ obligation, or ‘obligation of result’, could entail liability in 
the internal strict responsibility regime and serve to motivate States in their application of 
117 Philippe Sands. Principles of International Environmental Law. Cambridge University Press, 2003. at 
pages 246-247.
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their ‘obligations of means’ addressing the root causes of migration, namely ICESCR 
obligations. 
It could moreover be an opportunity to apply the common but differentiated 
responsibility principle in a new way. Recognizing the different role played by developed 
countries and countries in development in the deterioration of the environment, this 
principle calls for a distinction in the nature and degree of obligations and, when read in 
conjunction with the co-operation principle, calls for a transfer of technology and capitals 
as well as of technical assistance to help countries in development comply with their 
obligations. Such a principle could serve to divide the different burdens related to a 
situation where no ‘fault’ attaches responsibility to particular States. 
Furthermore, the gains deriving from the polluter pays principle could be used at 
the global level to help international funding such as the CERF. Although described as 
closely related to environmental standards as well as to civil and State liability applicable 
rules, and being dependant on problematic factors such as the valuation of direct and 
indirect environmental damages, contributing to a fund that would help lighten the 
monetary obligations of States could motivate them to make more proper use of this 
principle often unused for political reasons.
Finally, as is the case at present but in a more structured way, member States 
could be called upon to contribute to the resolution of environmental damages through 
the COP, regardless of whether their liability in a given situation is at issue or not.  
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4.3 An Integrated Solution
Those two proposed options to deal with ‘environmental migration claims’ show 
common characteristics shared by those lex specialist. Both depending strongly on ‘soft-
law’ such as guidelines and recommendations, reports, adoption of principles and 
interpretation, they face similar challenges. They struggle with implementation, as shows 
for example the lack of consistency found in each domain at national level. The system of 
adjudication of asylum claims is often strongly criticized for the inconsistencies118, in its 
interpretations from one State to another and from one system of law to another and in 
the application of the refugee definition criteria, just as in environmental law, which faces 
major inconsistencies in the adoption of regulations having the same threshold between 
States, and, if adopted at all, leading the ‘free-riders’ to push the ‘race to the bottom’119. 
Both options also present problems enforcing compliance with international standards. 
Those similarities suggest challenges to come in either model of assessment, such as the 
determination an eligible group of environmental victims. 
Asylum adjudication is described by Gregor Noll as being a double hybrid, 
incorporating features of both inquisitional and adversarial models as well as adapted 
concepts from administrative and penal procedure120. Fragmentation and inconsistencies 
in refugee adjudication scheme are explained mostly by “the freedom of states to choose 
a procedural system of their liking (…), thus the core issue of evidentiary assessment are 
sparingly addressed.”121. It is thus interesting to examine the possibility of a hybrid 
refugee and environmental procedural system aiming at international consistency, 
118 Greg Noll argues that “the issues related to evidentiary assessment in asylum cases are exposed to a 
higher degree of fragmentation and indeterminacy at international level than what applies to other areas of 
adjudication, and, second that this fragmentation and indeterminacy is reproduced rather than remedied in 
international law and scientific research”; Noll, Gregor (Ed). Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility 
in Asylum Procedures. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers [ The Raoul Wallenberg Institute Human 
Rights Library], 2005. 233pp.
119 The ‘race to the bottom’ is a phrase used in international environmental law to describe the phenomenon 
of levelling down in legislation and regulation in order to prevent the moving out of investment by 
companies. Those countries not applying international norms and standards in order to attract investments 
are said to be ‘free riders’.
120 Gregor Noll, supra footnote 118, at page 3.
121 Id. at page 5.
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thriving to overcome common weaknesses through a combination of both regimes as well 
as through the inclusion of other relevant concepts. Could the strength of both domains of 
international public law, dependant on an efficient and complex implementation at the 
national level, through administrative law, and struggling with the present challenges of 
environmentally induced migration, create a new system that is complete or is the import 
of weaknesses unavoidable?
In my opinion, a convention dealing with environmental issues of a magnitude 
forcing population to be displaced, as well as with the rights of individuals displaced and 
obligations of the States towards them is no doubt a human rights instrument. Thus, the 
debate about which particular field should be retained as offering the appropriate solution 
is not compulsory. As a decent environment is gradually officially recognized as a 
human right and refugee law has long been determine as such, there are few reasons why 
both aspects of those two fields, that is through the individual and the global approaches, 
could not complete one another. As suggested by D. Falstrom, any new convention could 
adopt the skeleton of CAT, creating rights and obligations inspired by the lex specialist of 
concern by the intertwined root-causes of migration.  
Thus, a new convention, as stated, could set up an international body, the 
Conference of Parties (COP), which would assess global environmental situations giving 
rise to international protection and determine the duties of the members States with 
regard to such a situation and the victims thereof. The convention could also include 
provisions allowing for the individual assessment, as in the 1951 Convention refugee 
regime, of environmental migrants who were able to leave their country and reach 
signatory States to seek individual asylum. 
The examination of an individual decision-making process based on the 
Convention refugee model showed the difficulty of requiring environmental migrants to 
establish a fear directly linked to the persecution concept, which is anchored by the 
necessity of an ‘act’ of the government. This obstacle, which sets too restrictive a limit to 
the vast spectrum of environmental degradation, could be circumvented by a more simple 
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and flexible ‘serious hardship’ criterion, with regard to which a claimant would have to 
demonstrate that he is a victim of a situation which has been found to meet the 
‘disruption threshold’ by the COP. The objectivity of the fear in a field tinged with 
uncertainty would also gain from a more universal determination by the COP, composed 
of experts. COP’s decisions would further be based on information that could be made 
accessible to an international organization’s secretariat. 
As for the global determination by the COP of a particular group affected by a 
qualifying situation, it could draw from the refugee regime, which has already 
experienced group situations and developed certain concepts regarding mass flux 
movements, such as ‘good offices’ and ‘persons of concern’. Those concepts could be 
sources of inspiration in manner to deal with current challenges. The ‘good office’ 
concept was elaborated to deal with situations where it is difficult to apply an individual 
assessment or where the flight is based on political reasons but the concept of persecution 
is inappropriate. It results in practice in the prima facie granting of temporary status of 
refugee to a specific group in a given situation, by applying more flexibly the Convention 
criteria. 
The first and foremost process could thus be a global assessment by the C.O.P. of 
the particular situation and a determination of whom is or is likely to be seriously 
affected, meeting the pre-established threshold of disruption and creating a prima facie
application of the protection provided in the instrument. Based on reports required of the 
countries, the location of the environmental disruption, the application of the ‘internal 
liability regime’, the C.O.P. could then designate the host country or countries and other 
obligations linked to the migration and settlement. This would give the C.O.P. a quasi-
judicial aspect, but such a body would not be a novelty. It would further have the 
legitimacy of representation of the different signatory States. 
The second process, offering individuals the possibility of seeking asylum on their 
own, as in the Convention refugee regime, would give a complementary role to 
adjudication systems already present in States. With a previous global assessment by the 
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COP, an assessment of individual claims at national level would serve the purpose of 
probing the serious hardship faced by the claimant and of preventing the inclusion of 
economic migrants, though identification may still be an issue. In such an assessment, it 
would be important to take from the 1951 Convention refugee model so as to put 
emphasis on the communication process in which the credible claimant would be given 
the ‘benefit of doubt’, and encourage decision-makers to accept facts or testimony which 
cannot be clearly proven. 
Finally, when dealing with a situation of war, attention should be given to make 
sure not to import the high threshold of environmental damage in the attribution of 
obligations to different countries, as IHL would be the main lex specialist applicable in 
time of armed conflicts.
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5 Conclusion
‘Environmental refugees’ is a controversial legal term used to describe the 
problematic situation of people forced to migrate due to environmental causes. This de 
facto situation finds itself in a lack of de jure context. This leads to a set of interesting 
and complex legal issues, such as the existence of a duty on States to mitigate the root 
causes of environmental migration and to take charge of the persons forced to 
displacement, as well as the current and future status of those migrants and the rights they 
should be recognized under international law. 
‘Environmental migrants’ are not recognized as refugee at present in 
international law and are thus considered on the same level as economic migrants. 
Nonetheless, they are in deep need of protection from the international community as 
their country of origin is often unable, for multiple reasons, to do so. The path proposed 
to offer such protection to the environmentally displaced persons varies in the literature: 
the pleading of their inclusion in the current refugee regime by broadening its 
interpretation; attempts to deal with the problem using available tools in international 
law; or suggesting the adoption of a new instrument based on different models and 
designed specifically to address the problem. 
In my opinion, a new instrument constitutes the best solution to fully encompass 
the problem. The decision of modeling a new convention on refugee law, environmental 
law or human rights law needs to be carefully thought. An assessment of the hypothetical 
implementation of a convention based on either refugee or environmental law in a daily 
basis decision-making process reveals the weaknesses and forces of both models. On the 
one hand, the refugee regime is too restrictive to apply generally to environmentally 
induced migration. Even though it may encompass certain situations, the concept of 
persecution is still too limited to appropriately address the problem of ‘environmental 
migrants’. Furthermore, the constitution of a social group represents another obstacle as 
the affected migrants do not share common and innate characteristics that differentiate 
them in the society. Lastly, due to intertwining of causes related to environmental 
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degradation and leading to migration, the demonstration of a nexus between the 
persecution through environmental means and the membership in a particular group is 
highly problematic. As for the environmental branch of international law, it is 
characterized by its deficient enforcement and struggle with responsibility allocation. The 
high requirements of IEL liability prevent protection based on responsibility. This leads 
to propose combining both regimes in the broader context of a human rights instrument in 
an attempt to overcome one system’s weaknesses through the other’s strengths. This 
would not amount to such a novelty as those two lex specialist have a lot of points in 
common and are both more flexible than they first appear. Indeed, both are related to the 
human rights branch of international law, and both are of a hybrid type of law, including 
aspects of administrative, penal and trade law as well as being inquisitional and 
adversarial. The usual creativity and flexibility of MEAs could cohabit with relevant 
adapted notions of refugee law in a human rights convention elaborating obligations on 
States as well as rights and conditions for the beneficiaries of international protection. 
Such an instrument would promote and gain from the growing recognition of socio-
economic rights in the refugee regime.
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Annex: Millennium Development Goals Indicators
Effective 8 September 2003
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Goals and Targets
(from the Millennium Declaration)
Indicators for monitoring progress
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose 
income is less than one dollar a day
1. Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per dayi
2. Poverty gap ratio [incidence x depth of poverty]
3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption
Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of
people who suffer from hunger
4. Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age
5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy 
consumption
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, 
will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education
7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5ii
8. Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015
9. Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education
10. Ratio of literate women to men, 15-24 years old
11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector
12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five 
mortality rate
13. Under-five mortality rate
14. Infant mortality rate
15. Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against measles
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality ratio
16. Maternal mortality ratio
17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of 
HIV/AIDS
18. HIV prevalence among pregnant women aged 15-24 years
19. Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rateiii
19a. Condom use at last high-risk sex
19b. Percentage of population aged 15-24 years with comprehensive 
correct knowledge of HIV/AIDSiv
19c. Contraceptive prevalence rate
20. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-
orphans aged 10-14 years
Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of 
malaria and other major diseases
21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria
22. Proportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria 
prevention and treatment measuresv
23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis
24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly 
observed treatment short course DOTS (Internationally recommended 
TB control strategy)
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
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Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
25. Proportion of land area covered by forest
26. Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area
27. Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per $1 GDP (PPP)
28. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita and consumption of ozone-
depleting CFCs (ODP tons)
29. Proportion of population using solid fuels
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
30. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water 
source, urban and rural
31. Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and 
rural
Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives 
of at least 100 million slum dwellers
32. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development
Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-
discriminatory trading and financial system
Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty 
reduction – both nationally and internationally
Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries
Includes: tariff and quota free access for the least developed countries' 
exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPC) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more 
generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction
Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries 
and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for 
the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the 
outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly)
Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing 
countries through national and international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long term
Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately for the least 
developed
countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked developing countries and small island 
developing States.
Official development assistance (ODA)
33. Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as percentage of 
OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income
34. Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors 
to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, 
safe water and sanitation)
35. Proportion of bilateral official development assistance of OECD/DAC 
donors that is untied
36. ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of 
their gross national incomes
37. ODA received in small island developing States as a proportion of their 
gross national incomes
Market access
38. Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding 
arms) from developing countries and least developed countries, 
admitted free of duty
39. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural 
products and textiles and clothing from developing countries
40. Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of 
their gross domestic product
41. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity
Debt sustainability
42. Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points 
and number that have reached their HIPC completion points 
(cumulative)
43. Debt relief committed under HIPC Initiative
44. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services
Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement 
strategies for decent and productive work for youth
45. Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and 
totalvi
Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries
46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a 
sustainable basis
59
Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the 
benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications
47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population
48. Personal computers in use per 100 population 
Internet users per 100 population
The Millennium Development Goals and targets come from the Millennium Declaration, signed by 189 countries, including 147 
heads of State and Government, in September 2000 (http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm). The goals and 
targets are interrelated and should be seen as a whole. They represent a partnership between the developed countries and the 
developing countries “to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and the 
elimination of poverty”.
Note: Goals, targets and indicators effective 8 September 2003.
i For monitoring country poverty trends, indicators based on national poverty lines should be used, where available.
ii An alternative indicator under development is “primary completion rate”.
iii Amongst contraceptive methods, only condoms are effective in preventing HIV transmission. Since the condom use rate is only measured among 
women in union, it is supplemented by an indicator on condom use in high-risk situations (indicator 19a) and an indicator on HIV/AIDS knowledge 
(indicator 19b). Indicator 19c (contraceptive prevalence rate) is also useful in tracking progress in other health, gender and poverty goals.
iv This indicator is defined as the percentage of population aged 15-24 who correctly identify the two major ways of preventing the sexual 
transmission of HIV (using condoms and limiting sex to one faithful, uninfected partner), who reject the two most common local misconceptions 
about HIV transmission, and who know that a healthy-looking person can transmit HIV. However, since there are currently not a sufficient number 
of surveys to be able to calculate the indicator as defined above, UNICEF, in collaboration with UNAIDS and WHO, produced two proxy indicators 
that represent two components of the actual indicator. They are the following: a) percentage of women and men 15-24 who know that a person 
can protect herself/himself from HIV infection by “consistent use of condom”; b) percentage of women and men 15-24 who know a healthy-looking 
person can transmit HIV.
v Prevention to be measured by the percentage of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bednets; treatment to be measured by 
percentage of children under 5 who are appropriately treated.
vi An improved measure of the target for future years is under development by the International Labour Organization.
